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Abstract. In an -approximate Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at
most  in expectation by unilateral deviation. An -well-supported ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium has the stronger requirement that every
pure strategy used with positive probability must have payoff within
 of the best response payoff. Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [8]
conjectured that every win-lose bimatrix game has a 2
3
-well-supported
Nash equilibrium that uses supports of cardinality at most three. Indeed,
they showed that such an equilibrium will exist subject to the correct-
ness of a graph-theoretic conjecture. Regardless of the correctness of this
conjecture, we show that the barrier of a 2
3
payoff guarantee cannot be
broken with constant size supports; we construct win-lose games that re-
quire supports of cardinality at least Ω( 3
√
logn) in any -well supported
equilibrium with  < 2
3
. The key tool in showing the validity of the
construction is a proof of a bipartite digraph variant of the well-known
Caccetta-Ha¨ggkvist conjecture [4]. A probabilistic argument [13] shows
that there exist -well-supported equilibria with supports of cardinality
O( 1
2
· logn), for any  > 0; thus, the polylogarithmic cardinality bound
presented cannot be greatly improved. We also show that for any δ > 0,
there exist win-lose games for which no pair of strategies with support
sizes at most two is a (1 − δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium. In con-
trast, every bimatrix game with payoffs in [0, 1] has a 1
2
-approximate
Nash equilibrium where the supports of the players have cardinality at
most two [8].
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1 Introduction
A Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is a pair of strategies in which the
supports of both players consist only of best responses. The apparent hardness
of computing an exact Nash equilibrium [6,5] even in a bimatrix game has led to
work on computing approximate Nash equilibria, and two notions of approximate
Nash equilibria have been developed. The first and more widely studied notion
is of an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-Nash). Here, no restriction is placed
upon the supports; any strategy can be in the supports provided each player
achieves an expected payoff that is within  of a best response. Therefore, -
Nash equilibria have a practical drawback: a player might place probability on
a strategy that is arbitrarily far from being a best response. The second notion,
defined to rectify this problem, is called an -well supported approximate Nash
equilibrium (-WSNE). Here, the content of the supports are restricted, but less
stringently than in an exact Nash equilibrium. Specifically, both players can only
place positive probability on strategies that have payoff within  of a pure best
response. Observe that the latter notion is a stronger equilibrium concept: every
-WSNE is an -Nash, but the converse is not true.
Approximate well-supported equilibria recently played an important role in
understanding the hardness of computing Nash equilibria. They are more useful
in these contexts than -Nash equilibria because their definition is more combina-
torial and more closely resembles the best response condition that characterizes
exact Nash equilibria. Indeed, approximate well-supported equilibria were intro-
duced in [12,6] in the context of PPAD reductions that show the hardness of
computing (approximate) Nash equilibria. They were subsequently used as the
notion of approximate equilibrium by Chen et al. [5] that showed the PPAD-
hardness of computing an exact Nash equilibrium even for bimatrix games.
Another active area of research is to investigate the best (smallest)  that can
be guaranteed in polynomial time. For -Nash, the current best algorithm, due
to Tsaknakis and Spirakis [18], achieves a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium; see [8,7,3]
for other algorithms. For the important class of win-lose games – games with
payoffs in {0, 1} – [18] gives a 14 -Nash equilibrium. For -WSNE, the current
best result was given by Fearnley et al. [10] and finds a ( 23 − ζ)-WSNE, where
ζ = 0.00473. It builds on an approach of Kontogiannis and Spirakis [13], which
finds a 23 -WSNE in polynomial time using linear programming. The algorithm of
Kontogiannis and Spirakis produces a 12 -WSNE of win-lose games in polynomial
time, which is best-known (the modifications of Fearnley et al. do not lead to an
improved approximation guarantee for win-lose games).
2
It is known that this line of work cannot extend to a fully-polynomial-time
approximation scheme (FPTAS). More precisely, there does not exist an FPTAS
for computing approximate Nash equilibria unless PPAD is in P [5]. Recall, an
FPTAS requires a running time that is polynomial in both the size of the game
input and in 1 . A polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS), however,
need not run in time polynomial in 1 . It is not known whether there exists a
PTAS for computing an approximate Nash equilibrium and, arguably, this is the
biggest open question in equilibrium computation today. While the best-known
approximation guarantee for -Nash that is achievable in polynomial time is
much better than that for -WSNE, the two notions are polynomially related:
there is a PTAS for -WSNE if and only if there is a PTAS for -Nash [5,6].
1.1 Our Results
The focus of this paper is on the combinatorial structure of equilibrium. Our
first result shows that well-supported Nash equilibria differ structurally from
approximate Nash equilibria in a significant way. It is known that there are 12 -
Nash equilibria with supports of cardinality at most two [12], and that this result
is tight [11]. In contrast, we show in Theorem 2 that for any δ > 0, there exist
win-lose games for which no pair of strategies with support sizes at most two is
a (1− δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.5
With supports of cardinality three, Daskalakis et al. conjectured, in the first
paper that studied algorithms for finding -WSNE [8], that 23 -WSNE are obtain-
able in every win-lose bimatrix game. Specifically, this would be a consequence
of the following graph-theoretic conjecture.
Conjecture 1 ([8]). Every digraph either has a cycle of length at most 3 or an
undominated set6 of 3 vertices.
The main result in this paper, Theorem 1, shows that one cannot do better
with constant size supports. We prove that there exist win-lose games that re-
quire supports of cardinality at least Ω( 3
√
log n) in any -WSNE with  < 23 . We
prove this existence result probabilistically. The key tool in showing correctness
is a proof of a bipartite digraph variant of the well-known Caccetta-Ha¨ggkvist
conjecture [4].
5 Random games have been shown to have exact equilibria with support size 2 with
high probability; see Ba´ra´ny et al. [2].
6 A set S is undominated if there is no vertex v that has an arc to every vertex in S.
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A polylogarithmic cardinality bound, as presented here, is the best we can
hope for – a probabilistic argument [13] shows that there exist -WSNE with
supports of cardinality O( 12 · log n), for any  > 0.7
2 A Lower Bound on the Support Size of Well Supported
Nash Equilibria
We begin by formally defining bimatrix win-lose games and well-supported Nash
equilibria. A bimatrix game is a 2-player game with m×n payoff matrices A and
B; we may assume that m ≤ n. The game is called win-lose if each matrix entry
is in {0, 1}.
A pair of mixed strategies {p,q} is a Nash equilibrium if every pure row
strategy in the support of p is a best response to q and every pure column
strategy in the support of q is a best response to p. A relaxation of this concept
is the following. A pair of mixed strategies {p,q} is an -well supported Nash
equilibrium if every pure strategy in the support of p (resp. q) is an -approximate
best response to q (resp. p). That is, for any row ri in the support of p we have
ei
TAq ≥ max
`
e`
TAq− 
and, for any column cj in the support of q we have
pTBej ≥ max
`
pTBe` −  .
In this section we prove our main result.
Theorem 1. For any  < 23 , there exist win-lose games for which every -well-
supported Nash equilibrium has supports of cardinality Ω( 3
√
log n).
To prove this result, we first formulate our win-lose games graphically. This
can be done in a straight-forward manner. Simply observe that we may represent
a 2-player win-lose game by a directed bipartite graph G = (R∪C,E). There is
a vertex for each row and a vertex for each column. There is an arc (ri, cj) ∈ E
if and only if (B)ij = bij = 1; similarly there is an arc (cj , ri) ∈ E if and only if
(A)ij = aij = 1.
Consequently, we are searching for a graph whose corresponding game has
no high quality well-supported Nash equilibrium with small supports. We show
7 For -Nash equilibria, Altho¨fer [1] and Lipton and Young [15] independently proved
similar results for zero-sum games, and Lipton at al. [16] later proved similar results
for general-sum bimatrix and multi-player games.
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the existence of such a graph probabilistically.
The Construction.
Let T = (V,E) be a random tournament on N nodes. Now create from T an
auxiliary bipartite graph G(T ) = (R∪C,A) corresponding to a 2-player win-lose
game as follows. The auxiliary graph has a vertex-bipartition R∪C where there
is a vertex of R for each node of T and there is a vertex of C for each set of
k distinct nodes of T . (Observe that, for clarity we will refer to nodes in the
tournament T and vertices in the bipartite graph G.) There are two types of arc
in G(T ): those oriented from R to C and those oriented from C to R. For arcs
of the former type, each vertex X ∈ C will have in-degree exactly k. Specifically,
let X correspond to the k-tuple {v1, . . . , vk} where vi ∈ V (T ), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Then there are arcs (vi, X) in G for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Next consider the latter type
of arc in G. For each node u ∈ R there is an arc (X,u) in G if and only if u
dominates X = {v1, . . . , vk} in the tournament T , that is if (u, vi) are arcs in T
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. This completes the construction of the auxiliary graph (game)
G.
We say that a set of vertices W = {w1, . . . , wt} is covered if there exists
a vertex y such that (wj , y) ∈ A, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Furthermore, a bipartite
graph is k-covered if every collection of k vertices that lie on the same side of the
bipartition is covered. Now with positive probability the auxiliary graph G(T )
is k-covered.
Lemma 1. For all sufficiently large n and k ≤ 3√log n, there exists a tourna-
ment T whose auxiliary bipartite graph G(T ) is k-covered.
Proof. Observe that the payoff matrices that correspond to G(T ) have m = N
rows and n =
(
N
k
)
columns. Furthermore, by construction, any set of k vertices
in R is covered. Thus, first we must verify that any set of k vertices in C is also
covered.
So consider a collection X = {X1, . . . , Xk} of k vertices in C. Since each
Xi ∈ C corresponds to a k-tuple of nodes of T , we see that X corresponds to a
collection of at most k2 nodes in T . Thus, for any node u /∈ ∪iXi, we have that
u has an arc in T to every node in ∪iXi with probability at least 2−k2 . Thus
with probability at most (1− 1
2k2
)N−k
2
the subset X of C not covered in G(T ).
Applying the union bound we have that there exists the desired tournament if(
n
k
)
·
(
1− 1
2k2
)N−k2
< 1 (1)
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Now set k = log
1
3 n. Therefore log n
1
k = log
2
3 n = k2.
In addition, because n =
(
N
k
)
, we have that N ≥ ke ·n
1
k . Hence, N−k2 > n 1k .
(Note that, since N ≥ k this implies that G(T ) is defined.) Consequently,
(
n
k
)
·
(
1− 1
2k2
)N−k2
≤ nk ·
(
1− 1
2k2
)n 1k
≤ nk · e−
1
2k
2 ·n
1
k
≤ nk · e−
1
ek
2·log 2 ·n
1
k
Thus, taking logarithms, we see that Inequality (1) holds if
ek
2·log 2 · k · log n < n 1k (2)
But n
1
k = ek
2
, so Inequality (2) clearly holds for large n. The result follows.
A property of the auxiliary graph G(T ) that will be very useful to us is that
it contains no cycles with less than six vertices.
Lemma 2. The auxiliary graph G(T ) contains no digons and no 4-cycles.
Proof. Suppose G(T ) contains a digon {w,X}. The arc (w,X) implies that X =
{x1, . . . , xk−1, w}. On the other-hand, the arc (X,w) implies that w dominates
X in T and, thus, w /∈ X.
Suppose G(T ) contains a 4-cycle {w,X, z, Y } where w and z are in R and
where X = {x1, . . . , xk−1, w} and Y = {y1, . . . , yk−1, z} are in C. Then z must
dominate X in T and w must dominate Y in T . But then we have a digon in
T as (w, z) and (z, w) must be arcs in T . This contradicts the fact that T is a
tournament.
Lemmas 1 and 2 are already sufficient to prove a major distinction between
approximate-Nash equilibria and well-supported Nash equilibria. Recall that
there always exist 12 -Nash equilibria with supports of cardinality at most two
[8]. In sharp contrast, for supports of cardinality at most two, no constant ap-
proximation guarantee can be obtained for -well-supported Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2. For any δ > 0, there exist win-lose games for which no pair of
strategy vectors with support sizes at most two is a (1− δ)-well-supported Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Take the auxiliary win-lose game G(T ) from Lemma 1 for the case k = 2.
Now consider any pair of strategy vectors p1 and p2 with supports of cardinality
6
2 or less. Since G(T ) is 2-covered, the best responses to p1 and p2 both gen-
erate payoffs of exactly 1. Thus {p1,p2} can be a (1 − δ)-well-supported Nash
equilibrium only if each strategy in the support of p1 is a best response to at
least one of the pure strategies in the support of p2 and vice versa. Therefore,
in the subgraph H of G(T ) induced by the supports of p1 and p2, each vertex
has in-degree at least one. Thus, H contains a directed cycle. But G(T ) has no
digons or 4-cycles, by Lemma 2. Hence, we obtain a contradiction as H contains
at most four vertices.
In light of Lemma 2, we will be interested in the minimum in-degree required
to ensure that a bipartite graph contains a 4-cycle. The following theorem may
be of interest on its own right, as it resolves a variant of the well-known Caccetta-
Ha¨ggkvist conjecture [4] for bipartite digraphs. For Eulerian graphs, a related
but different result is due to Shen and Yuster [17].
Theorem 3. Let H = (L ∪ R,A) be a directed k × k bipartite graph. If H has
minimum in-degree λ · k then it contains a 4-cycle, whenever λ > 13 .
Proof. To begin, by removing arcs we may assume that every vertex has in-
degree exactly λ · k. Now take a vertex v with the maximum out-degree in H,
where without loss of generality v ∈ L. Let A1 be the set of out-neighbours of
v, and set α1 · k = |A1|. Similarly, let Bt be the set of vertices with paths to v
that contain exactly t arcs, for t ∈ {1, 2}, and set set βt · k = |Bt|. Finally, let
C1 be the vertices in R that are not adjacent to v, namely C1 = L− (A1 ∪B1).
Set γ1 · k = |C1|.
These definitions are illustrated in Figure 1.
Observe that we have the following constraints on α1, β1 and γ1. By assump-
tion, β1 = λ. Thus, we have γ1 = 1 − α1 − λ. Moreover, by the choice of v,
we have α1 ≥ λ, since the maximum out-degree must be at least the average
in-degree.
Note that if there is an arc from A1 to B2 then H contains a 4-cycle. So, let’s
examine the in-neighbours ofB2. We knowB2 has exactly λ·k·|B2| incoming arcs.
We may assume all these arcs emanate from B1∪C1. On the other-hand, there are
exactly λ ·k · |B1| arcs from B2 to B1. Thus, there are at most |B1| · (|B2| − λ · k)
arcs from B1 to B2. So the number of arcs from C1 to B2 is at least
λ · k · |B2| − |B1| · (|B2| − λ · k) = λ · k · β2 · k − β1 · k · (β2 · k + λ · k)
= λ · k · β2 · k − λ · k · (β2 · k + λ · k)
= λ2 · k2
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B1  A1  C1 
B2  v 
Fig. 1.
Since the maximum degree is α1 · k, the number of arcs emanating from C1 is
at most γ1 · α1 · k2. Thus γ1 · α1 · (1− α1 − λ) ≥ λ2. Rearranging we obtain the
quadratic inequality
α21 − α1(1− λ) + λ2 ≤ 0
The discriminant of this quadratic is 1−2λ−3λ2. But 1−2λ−3λ2 = (1−3λ)(1+λ)
and this is non-negative if and only if λ ≤ 13 . This completes the proof.
We may now prove our main result: no approximation guarantee better than
2
3 can be achieved unless the well-supported equilibria has supports with cardi-
nality Ω( 3
√
log n).
Proof of Theorem 1. Take a tournament T whose auxiliary bipartite graph is
k-covered. By Lemma 1, such a tournament exists. Consider the win-lose game
corresponding to the auxiliary graph G(T ), and take strategy vectors p1 and p2
with supports of cardinality k or less. Without loss of generality, we may assume
that p1 and p2 are rational. Denote these supports as S1 ⊆ R and S2 ⊆ C,
respectively. As G(T ) is k-covered, there is a pure strategy c∗ ∈ C that covers
S1 and a pure strategy r
∗ ∈ R that covers S2. Thus, in the win-lose game, c∗ ∈ C
has an expected payoff of 1 against p1 and r
∗ ∈ R has an expected payoff of 1
against p2.
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Suppose p1 and p2 form a -well-supported equilibrium for some  <
2
3 . Then
it must be the case that each ri ∈ S1 has expected payoff at least 1− > 13 against
p2. Similarly, each cj ∈ S2 has expected payoff at least 1− > 13 against p1. But
this cannot happen. Consider the subgraph of G(T ) induced by S1 ∪ S2 where
each ri ∈ S1 has weight wi = p1(ri) and each cj ∈ S2 has weight wj = p2(cj). We
convert this into an unweighted graph H by making L ·wv copies of each vertex
v, for some large integer L. Now H is an L × L bipartite graph with minimum
in-degree (1− ) · L > 13 · L. Thus, by Theorem 3, H contains a 4-cycle. This is
a contradiction, by Lemma 2. uunionsq
We remark that the 23 in Theorem 1 cannot be improved using this proof
technique. Specifically the minimum in-degree requirement of 13 · k in Theorem
3 is tight. To see this, take a directed 6-cycle C and replace each vertex in C by
1
3 · k copies. Thus each arc in C now corresponds to a complete k3 × k3 bipartite
graph with all arc orientations in the same direction. The graph H created in
this fashion is bipartite with all in-degrees (and all out-degrees) equal to 13 · k.
Clearly the minimum length of a directed cycle in H is six.
3 Conclusion
An outstanding open problem is whether any constant approximation guarantee
better than 1 is achievable with constant cardinality supports. We have shown
that supports of cardinality two cannot achieve this; a positive resolution of
Conjecture 1 would suffice to show that supports of cardinality three can. How-
ever, Conjecture 1 seems a hard graph problem and it is certainly conceivable
that it is false.8 If so, that would lead to the intriguing possibility of a very
major structural difference between -Nash and -WSNE; namely, that for any
δ > 0, there exist win-lose games for which no pair of strategies with constant
cardinality supports is a (1− δ)-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
The existence of small support -WSNE clearly implies the existence of of
polynomial time approximation algorithms to find such equilibria. Obtaining
better approximation guarantees using more complex algorithms is also an in-
teresting question. As discussed, the best known polynomial-time approxima-
tion algorithm for well-supported equilibria in win-lose games finds a 12 -well
supported equilibrium [13] by solving a linear program (LP). For games with
8 For example, the conjecture resembles a question about the existence of k-
existentially complete triangle-free graphs for k > 3 referred to in [9], which the
authors consider to be wide open.
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payoffs in [0, 1] that algorithm finds a 23 -well-supported equilibrium. The algo-
rithm has been modified in [10] to achieve a slightly better approximation of
about 23 − ζ where ζ = 0.00473. That modification solves an almost identical
LP as [13] and then either transfers probability mass within the supports of a
solution to the LP or returns a small support strategy profile that uses at most
two pure strategies for each player. The results of this paper show that both
parts of that approach are needed, and any improvement to the approximation
guarantee must allow for super-constant support sizes.
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